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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JESSIE JIMINEZf 
Defendant-Respondent i 
Case No. 870399-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF_QF_£PPELLANT 
The State charged defendant with assault by a prisonerr 
a third degree felony, and the trial court dismissed the charge 
on defendant's motion. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMjENT
-
.OF_TjHE_IS5UE 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the charge of 
assault by a prisoner on the ground that the State destroyed 
evidence of the assault where defendant failed to establish that 
the alleged evidence ever existed or that it was material to her 
defense? 
STATEMENT_e£_TSE_£Ac;E 
The State charged defendant with assault by a prisoner 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) for an 
incident occurring on March 14, 1987 in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. Judge Frank Noel dismissed the charge on defendant's 
motion on September 9, 1987. The State now appeals. 
£TATEMENT_Q£_THE_FA£T£ 
The State alleged that defendant assaulted Officer 
Beesley while she was in custody in the Salt Lake County Jail on 
March 14, 1987 by attempting to do bodily injury to him with 
unlawful force or violence (R. 17). Defendant moved to dismiss 
the charge complaining that the incident was captured on video 
tape and that the tape was routinely destroyed after 72 hours (R. 
35)• She alleged that the tape was material to her defense 
stating "it is difficult to imagine a more compelling case for 
materiality than the video tape of the assault alleged in this 
action." (R. 36.) 
The State disputed the existence of a video tape 
depicting the assault (R. 32). The prosecutor urged that a mere 
possibility that a tape existed or that, if it did, it may have 
helped defendants defense was insufficient to establish 
materiality (R. 34)• 
After argument, the trial court dismissed the assault 
charge "for the reason that the State failed to retain any video 
tape of the incident" (R. 40-41). The State now appeals the 
dismissal. 
SaMMARY^QF^ARSUMEtlT 
The trial court erred in dismissing the assault charge 
where defendant failed to even offer proof that the incident was, 
in fact, captured on tape and that the tape was materially 
beneficial to her defense. Even if the incident were taped, 
defendant must have established more than a mere possibility that 
the tape might help her at trial. She must have shown that there 
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w a s n o a l t e r n a t i v e m e a n s of p r e s e n t i n n H I P a l l e g e d l y d e s t r o y e d 
e v i i l c n i H I i in 11 I Ii il in I I in mi i i t in mi mi I I 11 i11 I I I i mi i l u t e rise. . I l lani l i iny t e 
t h e i Unit shou ld have denit j ,i! hm mot ion lu d i s m i s s . 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE VIDEOTAPE WAS MATERIAL TO HER 
DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED THE CHARGE. 
in i ,,r p| eliminary hvu • . , t1 ) f I \ M '" 
.ill ' ' ' " ' t'uvery request- ""aln^  v. It" I apes taken nf *he 
alleged incident 11 4 "< ,
 t M The State responded th * " hf 
t a p e n t i l l mi 11 II I i m l mi in i ill i n II Ii Il in i II II I n II II II i< i it II i n b a n J L w d • 
r o u t i n e l y e i a o e d ami r e u s e d a t t e i 72 hour n when no tine r e q u e s t e d 
tha t it be p r e s e r v e d (R /HI I h e r e a f t e r ill I i ndaml moved t o 
d i '"i I  I  I i v I I in II • 11 i 11 in in II i II I  mi in I ii i 1 1 1 I in II 1 1 | in II II 11 i i II I in i II in in II HI ' II in mi 1 1 t " i n c i d e n t w a s 
v i d e o t a p e d by tlio equipment which was o p e r a t i n g a t II i Miill I.dl«e 
I 1 |> m l nil I i i i I I "  I, If P i ) T l ' - I ml I | n l i i I I I I I 
1
 n" > «i' i f 1 e i < ( i.i < " j t « 1 1 i> I 1 '|i i 11 (i u i J e ,' i i q i J i p H I e 1 1 L ( R . ) -," I J i• d g e 
NiIPI d i s m i s s e d t h e a s s a u l t c h a i g e b e c a u s e " t h e S t a t e f a i l e d Lu 
1 e l d i n a n y v i r i o n f a p o mint I I  i" M I i m 11 MI i II Mi1 ill I ill \) • 
Defendant, ai yued in IIPI niemoi diiduni s u p p o r t i n g h e r 
mot ion t o d i s m i s s t h a i t h e S t a t e had a du ty t o p r e s e r v e a l l 
m a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e IJUU I IMI ih i i i m i mn mi miner mii i1 irictK e 
d e n i e s a d e i u k J a i i t dut p i o t e v r I, I-, \b I he c l a imed "Id" • lie 
u'l'lt' " 'ape was m a t e r i a l I ,i» f a i l e d t o s u p p o r t f l i t c l a i i r w i M J f 
n v i d n n v I Ii I I  I I  II i mi i I i II in i (in I i ( IIIK Ml iii 11 mi I in ii"1 in I.IJ * i j L u i i mi MI I III 
b o o k i n g a r e a ml 1,1K ) a i l a c t u a l l y c a p t n i e d t h e a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t 
I K , J b J . N e v e r t h e l e s s , J u d g e N o e l d i s m i s s e d III I I I N U 
Without a showing of materiality/ the dismissal was 
erroneous. £±a±£„x±„§h£LISLt 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) 
summarized the Utah case law on the remedy for lost evidence. 
In £ia±S_v^_£i£H£j:;tf 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 
1975)f this Court held that a tape recording 
destroyed by a police officer before trial 
did not violate the defendants due process 
rights where the statements on the tape were 
not shown to be "vital" to the issue of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 479. 
SfiS 3l£Q Csdl3DB3_2*_M£iii5, 660 P.2d 1101, 
1108 (Utah 1983) (withholding of exculpatory 
testimonial evidence by prosecution did not 
violate due process where such evidence was 
tangential or cumulative); SiSijL-Yjt Nebeker» 
657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983) (failure of 
State to preserve photo array shown to victim 
before trial was not violative of due 
process). In S±jai£-YjL_NfikeJS£.E, we further 
explained the definition of "matericility" and 
said, "The materiality required to reverse a 
criminal conviction for suppression or 
destruction of evidence as a denial of due 
process is more than evidentiary 
materiality." Id. at 1363. The evidence 
must be material in the constitutional sense. 
Id. S£a±£_Y^_Lc2y3£Qr 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 
1985) , we explained that: 
[constitutional materiality 
requires that there be a showing 
that the suppressed or destroyed 
evidence is vital to the issues of 
whether the defendant is guilty of 
the charge and whether there is a 
fundamental unfairness that 
requires the Court to set aside the 
defendant's conviction. A 
corollary of this position is, "The 
mere pflssibiliiy that an item of 
undisclosed information jaisJji have 
helped the defense, or might have 
affected the outcome of the trial 
does not establish 'materiality1 in 
the constitutional sense." 
I£. at 106 (quoting nniifi^SiSifiS.iU^Aautsr 
417 U.S. 97f 109-10, 96 S. Ct* 2392, 2400-01, 
49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), and adding emphasis 
thereto; other citations omitted). 
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£>haIt"£Cj H *7»" *> i i i 11 i 111* 111 i 11 i"> i 11"' i' ,1 i*«• l'i'"11uiiiint m e r e l y 
d i i e y e d thdi mi nn i n c i d e n t was c a p t u r e d on t a p e pnd t h a t I t was 
hull She d id nut i howet l l e i aiiy evidence- h |"| i I 
! n i l ' i'i 11M i h j i i i i" 1hi.il j n yunu u v t i f vu i i v iewed 
i i " i dp*j t o d e t e r m i n e W'MJ! v as on i t b e f o r e it was e r a s e d In 
"I !• »
 r "in onp know" v1 •" i.» L 1 "i1.1, „ ' • ;, ' 
in i u JiJiNiliinl » d e l e i i b e , i.'oiijjoqiiently
 f d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d 
I I d . l i s h t h a t t h e t a p e was m a t e r i a l i v i t a l tu ne i d e f e n s e 
and t h e c o u r t ' s d i sm I s;»*i I wih n KM , 
1' u " llii I u|<i -I. I ipLdre t h e a l l e g e d a s s a u l t as 
d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s , liie c h a r g e shoalri n,.1 have Leen d i s m i s s e d . 
Tltf* f.ipp would pirft-l i mi l HI i ii 11 i! i i iii - i l n e s s e s or 
Liu de tendant , ihul ill m mil Uitj on ly a v a i l a b l e means of p r o v i n g 
i ill il happened . Both I I nf f i c e r ' w i r t i in ami 1 de fendan t a n 
a v a i l i I i Ii in I it|il in i n I lllii mi I i i mi i IIIIIII MI I In u i c , Jv Inhere t h e r e 
.nit ty e w i l n e s s e s wlm a i< a v a i l a b l e iiiini would be s u b j e c t tu c r o s s -
e x a m i n a t i o n i i lps t r u r t i on of n put • ' i l m i i n l i n m i i i iiii| toes 
i ii i I I i i i nJ i iuns . 5iaiS-VjL-PSiSj41 b H 7 V. ?i1 
l J I 14 ( A r i z . 1984i M ,. M- i , . v ^ _ S i a i f i » 379 S«< "I 4'i0 «'HnO-61 
( F l a . App. 1 9 B 0) (de fendan t mi I n u M I I HM« M ,\ i i I 
I i i I ah.lt.' dim I iK. m a t e r i a l l y b u n £ i c i a l tu de fenso l . 1 ££f lp l£_ lx 
BfiMdif 568 P. 2d 57 , 6 u - 6 1 (Colo I i i i . t n e s s e ? - - -* - l id 
t e s t i f y about r o n t r n l i I i i|i i PIL'I-JIL O # 
1
 % J . 1 yi s i I- i Lfk j , ) i o WIJU o v e r h e a r d taped p o l i c e d i s p a t ^ r 
b r o a d c a s t c o u l d t e s t i f y ) , > , . „s a <• igr f*«-'~ . , . . ^ 
between i I I ' | I \ n ji • U v « ' . *. .. i c e 
fo r which Lhei i d i e w i t n e s s e s a v a i l a b l e t» * e s t i f y and sa 
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cross examination. StatsSjL-Ii&L&QIl/ 146 Ariz. 287, 705 P.2d 
1338 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In her memorandum below, defendant relied upon several 
cases to support her position that dismissal was the only 
available remedy. Her reliance on these cases was misplaced for 
the reasons detailed below. 
Defendant relied on Ciiy_fi£_£fi3iil£_YjL_F£iii3, 10 Wash. 
App. 773, 519 P.2d 1002 (1974). Fettig was videotaped as he 
participated in sobriety tests and during an alleged assault. 
The tape was preserved and exhibited in his municipal court 
trial. However, before Fettig was retried in a trial de novo in 
Superior Court, the tape was destroyed. The municipal court 
judge testified in Superior Court that the tape "negated an 
impression of intoxication." 519 P.2d at 1005. The Superior 
Court denied Fettig's motion to dismiss and the court of appeals 
reversed finding that the destroyed evidence was favorable to 
Fettig; i.e.f it was material to his defense. 
F^iiiS is distinguishable from this case. Here, there 
is no evidence that there was anything relevant to the charge 
recorded on the tape. No one viewed the tape. Thus, there can 
be no finding of materiality here and, in fact, none was entered 
(R. 40-41, copy in Appendix A). SSS SlSQ Siaifi-S^^Ssj^ iiLSLt 20 
Wash. App. 388, 580 P.2d 265, 270 (1978) (defendant must offer 
proof of materiality and prejudicial effect of loss of evidence; 
i.e., reasonable possibility that evidence would have been 
favorable if preserved). 
-6-
Til Pendant a l s o l e i i ed l In iiiM'Lly nn P e o p l e v» Haymeg 
J? • 2 d 4 / u i i I | ii i i in i mi i III I i f 11» 
and an o f t i i n i « i \ i de o taped! and i n i t i a l l y t h e tape was 
l »Mh i j , lit, p r e l i m i n u t v I n u i i i i|P d e f e n s e c ouns e l wfl'i t ™»111 t h a t 
II III l II 11 )l In'I I I I II I II II H II HI e i V II I I I III II II II I ' M II I l 1 I HI i I I f j i i i. . j i i j i j | n s t 
III ii II mi mi III II i d u b s e q u e n i mi i iiiii I if HI I as e r a s e d . Trie C o l o r a d o Supreme 
Com t r e v e r s e d Harn" v i c t i o n s t a M n q tha* *b r i • "\\ """i" 
l III hiiii 1 i i i in II mi i III i ill II mi II 11 i mi III I IN II I i I I I I III 11 i i i i t i i J ) i n c i d e n t a l , 
1
 !, q u e s t i o n ot I H a r m e s ' l ,i'i I ' i. innocence ' " 'i*. 0 (*» 2J at 
4 7 3 . 
Ayuj II, UjJlLkjy i > 11 s l i i i ju i OIJULJ i Dince t h e r e was 
e v i d e n c e tha t t h e a c t s were f in t a c t , c a p t u r e d on I.nu ond t h e 
rtpprl l a t e c o u r t found r iiiii m in i i| i i i IIIII n i n i 11 inn i i i i mi J I • 
Hi. t a p e h e r e was nut i i iciteiial "» r T i t i c a l . I t mav not. have 
even c o n t a i n e r ] a n y t h i n q r e l e v a n t In d e f e n d a n t See «*!*?<? PCQPlC 
"rflllsy - "' l|M ' ' d e t e n J a r . t ii.ust 
e s t a b l i s h d i e a s o n a b l e p iobab i J i l i ) , Ihdt. e\ i dence c ou ld h. i % e 
a s s i s t e d h i s d e f e n s e ) . 
Def f'lid.jii I I IIIII I Iii I  i I di IIIIIU J tlidiL I h e s e c a s e s w r r a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e "cit a numbei of j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t have r e l u 
n e g l i g e n t d e s t r u c t i o n of HI V I In I in • I i I i i Inn i H I I 
r i t fe i lijjif | I in A • • i lyljtij ( K i 18) . Defenddii i i m~~ ~ i t e d 
Sia i f i . l jL .B^ydf 62 9 P.2d "I III Mm Ii m i n i BO,Y*I IS a l s o 
d i R t in q 111 sha b 1 e ni n c e t hc• a 11 11 i > i i \n 111 i 111 | i 11 i i i 
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W d ! i I f iH "i . 1"' r I ' | i >,i i | I i I u u i u i 
material based upon the specific facts that surfaced at trial. 
Boyd claimed that his car was not the vehicle which the police 
had been pursuing on the night in question and had lost contact 
with during the chase* Certain evidence was consistent with both 
scenarios and the police officers1 testimony was not all 
corroborative of the State's case. Boyd wanted the tapes to show 
that the description of the pursued vehicle did not match hisf 
that no siren was sounded/ and that Boyd could not have travelled 
from where the pursuing officer stated the pursued vehicle's last 
location to where Boyd was stopped. Based upon these assertions 
and the inconclusive nature of the available evidence and that 
the jury in Boyd's first trial was unable to reach a verdict/ the 
court found a denial of due process. 
In this casef because there has been no trial/ there 
was no basis to conclude that the videotape was necessary to 
corroborate any testimony in either the State's or defendant's 
cases. Defendant offered no explanation of what she expected to 
find on the tape or how it was to have corroborated or disproved 
anything. Defendant merely used the fact of its erasure to avoid 
prosecution. As the Florida Supreme Court has said: 
the purpose of the discovery rule is to aid a 
defendant in the preparation of his casef not 
to give him a procedural escape hatch for the 
avoidance of prosecution . . .. [T]he mere 
fact that a taped recording which may have 
been utilized in evidence was destroyed does 
not require automatic reversal. 
££a±£_Xx_Sfil2£l r 363 So. 2d 324 f 327 (Fla. 1978) . 
Defendant next r e l i e d on £iai£_v+SSLSZi 687 P.2d 1214 
(Ariz. 1984) . The i s sue in ESLSZ. was not whether charges should 
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have been dismissed as the result of loss of a videotape of a 
robbery but whether Perez was entitled to a jury instruction 
stating that it could be assumed that the tape contained evidence 
that was against the State's interest. 687 P.2d at 1219. The 
court held that Perez was not entitled to such an instruction 
since he did not prove any prejudice from the loss of the 
evidence, which the court said was obviously material, since 
there were eyewitnesses to the robbery who testified at trial. 
This case does not support defendant's theory of automatic 
dismissal but, in fact, supports the State's position that 
defendant was required to show constitutional materiality under 
ShaZtSLi 725 P.2d at 1305. 
Defendant also relied on Farrell v. State* 317 So. 2d 
142 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Her reliance is misplaced 
because there, the State stipulated that there was evidence on 
the destroyed audio tape that was beneficial to Farrell and that 
his defense was prejudiced by its loss. Farrell does not stand 
for the proposition that the charge must always be dismissed when 
evidence is destroyed but rather that a defendant must show that 
the evidence was not otherwise available and was materially 
beneficial to his defense. MaihiS-JU-S±aJt£, 379 So. 2d at 460-
61. 
J5ii£hfill.Sjt-SiaJt£f 358 So. 2d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978) also cited by defendant in her memorandum is entirely 
unpersuasive because it was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court 
in fiiflJtAJA-ISlifilUBll# 368 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1979). §£S alSQ Siaifi 
YjL_iifi]3£l/ 363 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1978) (relied upon in MiJtfiJlfill as 
basis for reversal of appellate court). 
-9-
Finallyf defendant cited R&QSle^XjtSa&siX9 445 N.Y.S.2d 
601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). While Ssddy does support defendant's 
contention that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy, it is 
not persuasive or controlling because it conflicts with jgjta±£_.YjL 
ShflfifiXr 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), the controlling case law. 
J§fl&3y mandates dismissal without requiring a defendant to make 
any showing whatsoever as to materiality and ignores any 
possibility that the evidence could come in by other means such 
as the testimony of eyewitnesses. Shaffer on the other hand 
requires a showing of constitutional materiality and is 
consistent with case law from other jurisdictions that recognize 
the possibility that other evidence may suffice. The logical 
extension of cases such as Sa^dy is that no case of assault by a 
prisoner could be tried where a videotape was not available for 
any reason (such as, a tape was never made) because the 
possibility exists that one fioulsi be made. It borders upon the 
ridiculous to find that, where eyewitnesses exist/ a case cannot 
be tried merely because there is no videotape of the incident to 
"prove" that the witnesses axe or are not lying. 
From the above discussion, it appears that the trial 
court relied on case law from other jurisdictions to support its 
dismissal of the charge in this case and ignored Utah law 
requiring defendant to establish constitutional materiality. For 
this reason/ the decision of the trial court should be reversed 
and the assault charge reinstated. 
-10-
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to reverse the order of dismissal and to reinstate the assault 
charge* 
DATED this «§£5l_ day of J ^ ^ 2 2 ^ ^ L r 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
€&*£ 
ANDRA L.(s£aT%REl 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING_£ERTIFI££TE 
I hereby certify that on the Z®Z± day of December, 
1987, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and 
exact copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to 
James Bradshaw, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South 
Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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APPENDIX A 
fii-LDtNCLEPK'SCFr-.Gfc 
Ss'iUHs County. Utah 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNIE JONES 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
:;5i9y7cierk 3rd D i s t J ^ l . 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JESSIE JIMENEZ, ^ 
v. 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. CR 87-777 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
The defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve 
evidence came on for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on 
the 21st day of August, 1987. The defendant was present and 
represented by James Bradshaw. The State was represented by Ernie 
Jones, Deputy County Attorney. The Court having heard the argument 
of counsel and having read the brief of both parties grants the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge of Assault by a 
Prisoner pursuant to $76-5-102.5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended is dismissed for the reason that the State failed to retain 
' •. f \ r » * • ••*.'' 
Order of Dismissal 
CR 87-777 
Page 2 
any video tape of the incident at the Salt Lake County Jail 
involving the defendant on March 13, JL987. 
of AuguVty 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED thi is ^j day 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this M\\ day of August", 1987, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal 
to James Bradshaw, Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated 
below. 
Pcw£\-frrcr?C 
Secretary 
JAMES BRADSHAW 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Legal Defenders Association 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
cjb 
